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International Law on the Left: 
Revisiting Marxist Legacies 
 
Susan Marks (editor) 
 
Positivism versus self-determination: the contradictions of Soviet international law 
Bill Bowring, Birkbeck College, University of London 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Soviet theory and practice of international law, if it is the subject of any 
consideration today at all, is usually dismissed as a purely historical example of an 
extreme species of positivism, and of no contemporary interest. Most often it is 
ignored. For example, in his article ‘What Should International Lawyers Learn from 
Karl Marx?’,1 Martti Koskenniemi does not mention Soviet international law at all. 
Even an avowed Marxist scholar of international law does little more. In his article2, 
‘An Outline of a Marxist Course on Public International Law’3 B. S. Chimni  
contrasts the definition of ‘treaties’ in what he terms ‘Mainstream International Law 
Scholarship”:  
“… with the definitions offered by the Soviet scholars Korovin and 
Pashukanis: ‘Every international agreement is the expression of an established 
social order, with a certain balance of collective interests’;4 ‘A treaty 
obligation is nothing other than a special form of the concretization of 
economic and political relationships’.5 These definitions, through drawing in 
extra-textual reality, offer greater insight into the meaning of a treaty than the 
formal definition offered by MILS. They refer us to both the fact of an 
established (capitalist) social order and to its concretization as economic and 
political rules embodying a certain balance of collective (class) interests.”6 
However, these authors are not introduced save as ‘Soviet scholars’, no context at all 
is given, nor the fact that they were bitter enemies. Soviet international law even in 
                                                 
1 M. Koskenniemi ‘What Should International Lawyers Learn from Karl Marx’ (2004) vol.17 Leiden 
Journal of International Law 229-246 
2 in the same special issue of a progressive international law journal, the Leiden Journal 
3 B. Chimni ‘An Outline of a Marxist Course on Public International Law’ (2004) vol.17 Leiden 
Journal of International Law 1-30 
4 E. Korovin, ‘Soviet Treaties and International Law’, (1928) vol.22 American Journal of International 
Law 753, at p.763 (emphasis added). 
5 E. Pashukanis, Pashukanis: Selected Writings on Marxism and Law (eds. Bierne and R. Sharlet) 
(London: Academic Press, 1980) at p.181 (emphasis added). 
6 B. Chimni Ibid at p.12 
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this Marxist account barely exists; in the standard genre of the history of international 
law it is mentioned only to be dismissed.  
I wish to take a very different position. I seek to argue in the following paragraphs 
that the contradictions of Soviet international law have generated some of the most 
important propositions and principles of contemporary international law, and are of 
continuing relevance. 
This chapter starts with a typical description in the standard genre, by a distinguished 
contemporary international legal scholar. I then trace the development of Soviet 
international law through a double refraction: what it said about itself, in some bitterly 
fought theoretical struggles; and what was said about it by the attentive scholars of the 
United States. For this purpose I trace the trajectory of Yevgeny Pashukanis, the best 
known Marxist theorist of law in the west, in part as refracted in the writings of US 
scholars of international law. I show that despite following developments in Soviet 
international law with close interest, these observers entirely misunderstood what they 
sought to analyse. It should be said that the leading Soviet theorists did so too. This 
tradition of misunderstanding has continued until the present day. I contend that this 
is true also of the most sophisticated and committed of contemporary Marxist scholars 
of international law, China Mieville. I engage respectfully with his impressive work. 
More importantly however, there was on my contention a clear-cut contradiction 
between the positivism of the legal text-books, and the actual practice of the 
Bolshevik and then Soviet doctrine of the ‘Right of Peoples to Self-Determination’. 
Thus, the USSR gave enormous material and moral support to the National Liberation 
Movements, and led the successful drive to see the principle and then right to self-
determination placed at the centre of public international law in the 20th and 21st 
centuries. 
2. ‘TAKING THE DOGMA FOR A WALK’ 
Western scholars are familiar with what is generally termed the “Marxist-Leninist 
theory” in international law, and with its standard characterisation.7 Ian Scobbie in a 
                                                 
7 I. Scobbie ‘Some Common Heresies about International Law: Sundry Theoretical Perspectives’ in 
Malcolm Evans (ed) International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2006) , 83-112 at 
p.84 
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recent comparison of Soviet and 'New Haven' theories refers to “the Soviet theory of 
international law propounded by G I Tunkin.”8 For Scobbie, Soviet theory amounted 
to a “constitutive” (rather than a “facilitative”) theory.9 It relied on “the objective 
rules of societal development and the historical inevitability of socialism.”10 That is, it 
was thoroughly mechanical in spirit and exposition. 
There can be no surprise that Scobbie refers only to Tunkin. William Butler’s 
translation of Tunkin's textbook made available to a Western audience the only 
substantial Soviet text in English on international law.11  Tunkin, born in 1906, died 
aged 87 in 1993, while completing the last edition of his Theory of International Law, 
and having just submitted an article – on customary international law - to the 
European Journal of International Law. Here he wrote of the attempt “… to create a 
new world order based on the rule of law”.12  
Scobbie comments that Soviet theory was structurally highly traditional, and firmly 
rooted in Marxist-Leninist theory to the extent that “at time, it seems simply to 
amount to taking the dogma for a walk.”13 This was certainly true of Tunkin’s 
textbook. It was also very conservative, recognising only rules and State consent to 
rules: as Damrosch and Müllerson explained it, Soviet theory treated “the existing 
corpus of international law as a system of sufficiently determinate principles and 
norms which all states are obliged to observe in their mutual relations…”14 As a 
direct consequence, Soviet theory rejected “the general principles of law recognised 
by the civilised nations”15  
                                                
The existence of two opposed social systems meant that the only norms of 
“customary” or “general” international law could be those which were neither 
socialist nor capitalist. Tunkin asserted that: “only those international legal norms 
which embrace the agreement of all states are norms of contemporary general 
 
8 I. Scobbie Ibid p.92 
9  I. Scobbie Ibid p.92 
10  I. Scobbie Ibid p.96 
11 G. Tunkin  Theory of International Law (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1974)  
12 G. Tunkin ‘Is General International Law Customary Only?’ vol.4, n.4 European Journal of 
International Law 534-541, at p.534 
13 I. Scobbie Ibid at p.97 
14 L. Damrosch and R. Mullerson ‘The Role of International Law in the Contemporary World’ in 
J.F.Damrosch, G.M.Danilenko, and Mullerson R (eds) Beyond Confrontation: International Law for 
the Post-Cold War Era (1995)  at p.9 
15 Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice 
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international law.”16 Thus, Soviet theory recognised only treaties and custom – 
narrowly defined as above – as sources of international law. 
The US scholar Alwyn Freeman (1910-1983)17, writing much earlier, also noted that 
Soviet international law embraced: 
“…the most extreme form of positivism… The Soviet brand of positivism is 
much more restricted, much narrower, and is, in sum, a rejection of a great 
portion of international legal principles… Soviet positivism has been 
distinguished by the exclusion of customary practice as a source of 
international obligations. It views international law as embracing only those 
principles to which states have expressly consented through an international 
agreement or have otherwise manifested their acquiescence.”18  
Indeed, writing in 1948, at the time of his frenetic activity in the United Nations as 
leader of the Soviet delegation, the notorious Andrey Vyshinsky19 wrote that “… the 
Soviet theory of international law regards the treaty, resting on the principles of 
sovereign equality of peoples and the respect for mutual interests and rights as the 
basic source of international law. This secures for international law and its institutions 
full moral as well as juridical force since at their base will lie the obligations agreed to 
and voluntarily assumed by nations.”20 
There is, however, a point at which this conservatism shows another, opposite side. 
Freeman did not fail to notice it, in his discussion of sovereignty. He explained that 
the Soviets “… retain the classical, strict conception of states alone as the subjects of 
                                                 
16 G. Tunkin Theory of International Law (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974) at 
pp.250-251 
17 Freeman was an editor of the American Journal of International Law from 1955 to 1972, worked on 
international claims cases while in the US State Department, and served in the Army Judge Advocate 
General’s Office in WW II, on the staff of the Senate Committee on Foreign relations, and as an 
official of the IAEA.  
18 A. Freeman ‘Some Aspects of Soviet Influence on International Law’ (1968) American Journal of 
International Law vol.62, n3,  710-722, at p.713 
19 Andrey Vyshinsky was born in Odessa, Russia, on 28th November, 1883. As a young man he joined 
the Social Democratic Party. In the 1903 split, he sided with the Mensheviks. Vyshinsky became a 
lawyer and after the October Revolution he joined the Bolsheviks. He taught law at Moscow State 
University until becoming a state prosecutor. Between 1934 and 1938 Vyshinsky was the leading 
prosecutor in the “show trials” of Stalin’s opponents. In 1940 he was given the responsibility of 
managing the (illegal) occupation of Latvia. He also helped establish communist rule in Romania 
before becoming Soviet foreign minister in March, 1949. He survived the purge that followed the death 
of Joseph Stalin in 1953 and continued as the Soviet representative in the United Nations. Vyshinsky 
died in New York on 22nd November, 1954. 
20 A. Vyshinsky ‘Mezhdunarodnoye pravo i mezhdunarodnaya organisatsiya (International Law and 
International Organisation)’ (1948) No.1 Sovetskoye gosudarstvo i pravo (Soviet State and Law) 22, 
cited in J. Triska ‘Treaties and Other Sources of Order in International Relations: The Soviet View” 
(1958) vol.52 n.4 American Journal of International Law 699-726, at p.713 
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international law, with a rigid insistence on sovereignty in its most extreme form, a 
form which must deny the paramount nature of international law over national law. 
They do, however, recognise an exception in favour of peoples fighting for “national  
liberation.””21  It is very odd, however, that Freeman did not notice the basis for such 
a claim: the right of peoples to self-determination. This “principle” had become a 
“right” as the common first article of the two International Covenants of 1966 – the 
“International Bill of Rights”.    
Scobbie quite rightly notes the notorious so-called “Brezhnev doctrine”, that relations 
between socialist states are not based on “peaceful co-existence”, but on “proletarian 
internationalism”. This hypocritical policy justified the invasions of Hungary in 1956, 
Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Afghanistan in 1980.22 But, curiously, he says nothing 
about the application of the “right of peoples to self-determination” to Soviet support 
for the national liberation struggles of three decades from WWII. 
In the next section of this chapter, therefore, I analyse the origins of the Soviet 
doctrine of the right of nations to self-determination. It should be noted that in 
Russian as in many other languages, “nation” and “people” are practically 
synonymous. 
3. THE BOLSHEVIKS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
3.1 Bolshevism versus Austro-Marxism 
The Bolshevik and then Soviet doctrine of the right of nations to self-determination 
had its origin in the uncompromising pre-WW I struggle between Lenin, Stalin and 
Trotsky (and orthodox Marxists with Karl Kautsky at their head) on the one side, and 
the Austro-Marxist theorists such as Karl Renner and Otto Bauer on the other.23  
Austro-Marxist ideas of non-territorial personal autonomy, developed as a possible 
antidote to the dissolution of the multi-national Austro-Hungarian Empire, found a 
ready audience among the Jews of the Russian Empire. The Jews had no “historic” or 
                                                 
21 A. Freeman ‘Some Aspects of Soviet Influence on International Law’ (1968) vol.62, n3  American 
Journal of International Law 710-722, at p.716 
22 I. Scobbie Ibid at p.99 
23 B.Bowring ‘Burial and Resurrection: Karl Renner’s controversial influence on the ‘National 
Question’ in Russia’ in E. Nimni (ed) National-Cultural Autonomy and its Contemporary Critics 
(London: Routledge, 2005) 
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“consolidated” territory.  The Jewish “Bund” (Algemeyner Yidisher Arbeter Bundin 
Lite, Poyln un Rusland) was founded in Vilna (now Vilnius, capital of Lithuania) in 
1897, as a Jewish political party espousing social democratic ideology as well as 
cultural Yiddishism and Jewish national autonomism.24 The First Congress of the 
Russian Social Democratic Labour Party in 1898 decided that the Bund “is affiliated 
to the Party as an autonomous organisation independent only in regard to questions 
specifically concerning the Jewish proletariat.”25 It was from the start influenced by 
the ideas of Renner and Bauer, although Renner’s model did not allow for diasporas 
or scattered minorities.26 As Yves Plasseraud points out:  
“The leaders of the Bund and the Jewish Socialist Workers Party therefore 
took on the task of adapting Renner’s ideas to the situation of the Yiddish-
speaking Jews of Central and Eastern Europe… The Bundist leaders proposed 
that Russia, like the Austro-Hungarian Empire, should become a federation of 
autonomous peoples.”27 
Vladimir Ilich Ulyanov (Lenin), the leader of the Bolsheviks following the split in the 
RSDLP in 1903, was a bitter opponent of the Bund and of the Austro-Marxist 
prescription. In October 1903 he published an article entitled “The Position of the 
Bund in the Party”.28 He was especially critical of the Bund’s idea of a Jewish nation. 
He argued that: “Unfortunately, however, this Zionist idea is absolutely false and 
essentially reactionary. ‘The Jews have ceased to be a nation, for a nation without a 
territory is unthinkable’, says one of the most prominent of Marxist theoreticians, Karl 
Kautsky.” Lenin was wholly in agreement with Kautsky on this point. 
Lenin thus adopted Kautsky’s orthodox “scientific” definition of the concept 
“nationality”, with two principal criteria: language and territory.29 Both Lenin and 
Kautsky were in favour of Jewish assimilation. 
At the January 1912 Conference of the RSDLP(B), the Jewish Bund declared that it 
had been influenced by Austro-Marxist theories of personal or non-territorial national 
                                                 
24 In the Bund Archive at the Russian State Archive of Social and Political History (GRASPI), Moscow 
25 The CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of Its Congresses, Conferences and Plenary Meetings of the 
Central Committee (Moscow: Progress, 1954) Part 1, 14 
26 Y. Plasseraud “How to solve Cultural Identity Problems: Choose your own nation” Le Monde 
Diplomatique May 2000, p.4 at www.globalpolicy.org/nations/citizen/region.htm 
27 Y. Plasseraud Ibid p.4 
28 V.I.Lenin Complete Collected Works (2nd ed) Vol 7 Moscow: Progress, 1968),  92, first published in 
Iskra 22 October 1903, n.51 
29 K. Kautsky, Neue Zeit, 1903, No.2 
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cultural autonomy. Consequently, at the August conference of the RSDLP(B), it 
adopted a resolution “On National Cultural Autonomy”, including it in the 
programme of the Bund.30  
Lenin’s reply was uncompromising. In 1913, in his "Draft Platform of the 4th 
Congress of the Social Democrats of the Latvian Area", he denounced the "bourgeois 
falsity of the slogan of "cultural national autonomy". He asserted that in Russia only 
the Jewish Bund members – “together with all the Jewish bourgeois parties” - had so 
far defended this concept.31 Later that year he devoted an article to "Cultural-National 
Autonomy"32. He once more denounced this plan, as “an impossibility”:  
“A clear grasp of the essence of the “cultural-national autonomy” programme 
is sufficient to enable one to reply without hesitation – it is absolutely 
impermissible. As long as different nations live in a single state they are bound 
to one another by millions and thousands of millions of economic, legal and 
social bonds. How can education be extricated from these bonds? Can it be 
‘taken out of the jurisdiction of the state’, to quote the Bund formula?”  
Lenin particularly mocked the references to Austria: 
“… why should the most backward of the multinational countries be taken as 
the model? Why not take the most advanced? This is very much in the style of 
the bad Russian liberals, the Cadets, who for models of a constitution turn 
mainly to the backward countries such as Prussia and Austria, and not to 
advanced countries such like France, Switzerland and America!” 
3.2 Stalin’s “scientific” contribution 
Also in early 1913, J. V. Stalin published, under Lenin’s instruction, his one 
substantial work of theory, Marxism and the National Question.33 This devoted a 
whole chapter to “Cultural-National Autonomy”, and was primarily designed as a 
reply to the Bund. Stalin attempted his own definition of a nation: 
                                                 
30 V Filippov “Natsionalno-Kulturnaya Avtonomiya: klassicheskaya kontseptsiya i yeyo sovremennaya 
interpretatsiya (National-Cultural Autonomy: the classical conception and its contemporary 
interpretation), 63-84 in Ye. Filippova (ed) Natsionalno-Kulturnaya Avtonomiya: problemy i 
suzhdeniya (National-Cultural Autonomies: problems and evaluation) (Moscow: Etnosfera 1998) - 
Materials from the Round Table organised by the “Etnosfera” Centre; at p.66 
31 V. Lenin Complete Collected Works (2nd ed. 1968) Vol 19 p.117, first published in Za Pravda 28 
November 1913, n.46 
32 V. Lenin Ibid p.503 n.30 
33 J. Stalin Marxism and the National Question nos 3-5 Prosveshniye (Enlightenment) March-May 
1913, at www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1913/03.htm 
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“A nation is a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on 
the basis of a common language, territory, economic life and psychological 
make-up manifested in a common culture.”  
It is noteworthy that Stalin’s definition of the nation is not so far from contemporary 
orthodoxy. Anthony D. Smith defines ethnie as: 
“… a named unit of population with common ancestry myths and shared 
historical memories, elements of shared culture, a link with a historic territory, 
and some measure of solidarity, at least among the elites.”34  
Note the importance of the link to territory. Again, he defines the modern nation, in 
ideal-typical terms, as “… a named human population sharing a historic territory, 
common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy 
and common rights and duties for all members.” John Hutchinson, too, contends that 
“… Nations are distinguished in addition by a commitment to citizenship rights, and 
the possession of a high literate culture, a consolidated territory and a unified 
economy.” 
They are all agreed on the importance of territory. 
Stalin’s next move was a critique of Renner and Bauer, insisting on the importance of 
territory: “Bauer’s point of view, which identifies a nation with its national character, 
divorces the nation from its soil, and converts it into an invisible, self-contained 
force.” Stalin answer was as follows: “… there is no doubt a) that cultural-national 
autonomy presupposes the integrity of the multi-national state, whereas self-
determination goes outside the framework of this integrity, and b) that self-
determination endows a nation with complete rights, whereas national autonomy 
endows it only with cultural rights.”… and he further warned that “Springer’s and 
Bauer’s cultural-national autonomy is a subtle form of nationalism.” 
3.3. The Bolshevik origins of the right to self-determination 
Applying his definition and critique to the national question in Russia, Stalin started 
from the assertion that “the right of self-determination is an essential element in the 
solution of the national question.” For “crystallised units” such as Poland, Lithuania, 
                                                 
34 A. Smith “Nations and History” in M. Guibernau and J. Hutchinson (eds) Understanding 
Nationalism (London: Polity, 2001), pp.9-31, at p.19. See also A. D. Smith “Dating the nation” in D. 
Conversi (ed) Ethnonationalism in the Contemporary world: Walker Connor and the study of 
nationalism” (London: Routledge, 2002), pp.53-71 
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the Ukraine, the Caucasus etc he believed that national autonomy could not solve the 
problem, and the only correct solution was regional autonomy, for a definite 
population inhabiting a definite territory. The national minorities in each of these 
territories need not fear the result: “Give the country complete democracy and all 
grounds for fear will vanish.” This would include equal rights of nations in all forms – 
liberty of conscience, liberty of movement, languages, schools, etc. 
In December 1913 Lenin began himself to write on the question of the “right of 
nations to self-determination”. In a short polemic35 on the question of independence 
for Ukraine, he insisted on “… freedom to secede, for the right to secede”, while 
conceding that “… the right to self-determination is one thing, of course, and the 
expediency of self-determination, the secession of a given nation under given 
circumstances, is another.” Later in December 191336 he again declared that “A 
democrat could not remain a democrat (let alone a proletarian democrat) without 
systematically advocating, precisely among the Great-Russian masses and in the 
Russian language, the “self-determination” of nations in the political and not in the 
“cultural” sense.” The latter, he said, meant only freedom of languages. 
In April-June 1914 Lenin published his own substantial work on the question, a 
polemic against Rosa Luxemburg, who opposed the break-up of the Tsarist Empire, 
“The Right of Nations to Self-Determination”.37 In the first chapter, he insisted that 
“… it would be wrong to interpret the right to self-determination as meaning anything 
but the right to existence as a separate state.”38 Furthermore, “… the national state is 
the rule and the “norm” of capitalism: the multi-national state represents 
backwardness… from the standpoint of national relations, the best conditions for the 
development of capitalism are undoubtedly provided by the national state.”39  
His understanding of the historical significance of the demand is highly significant for 
this chapter: 
                                                 
35 V. Lenin ‘The Cadets and “The Right of Nations to Self-Determination”, Proletarskaya Pravda 
No.4, 11 December 1913, Collected Works (1977) vol.19, 525-527, at 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1913/dec/11.htm 
36 V. Lenin ‘National-Liberalism and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination’ Proletarskaya 
Pravda No.12, 20 December 1913, Collected Works (1972) vol.20, pp.56-58, at 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1913/dec/20.htm 
37 published in the journal Prosveshcheniye Nos.4, 5 and 6, Collected Works (1972) vol.20, pp.393-
454, at http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1914/self-det/index.htm 
38 http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1914/self-det/ch01.htm, p.2 
39 http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1914/self-det/ch01.htm, p.5 
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“The epoch of bourgeois-democratic revolutions in Western, continental 
Europe embraces a fairly definite period, approximately between 1789 and 
1871. This was precisely the period of national movements and the creation of 
national states. When this period drew to a close, Western Europe had been 
transformed into a settled system of bourgeois states, which, as a general rule, 
were nationally uniform states. Therefore, to seek the right to self-
determination in the programmes of West-European socialists at this time of 
day is to betray one’s ignorance of the ABC of Marxism.  
In Eastern Europe and Asia the period of bourgeois-democratic revolutions did 
not begin until 1905. The revolutions in Russia, Persia, Turkey and China, the 
Balkan wars - such is the chain of world events of our period in our “Orient”. 
And only a blind man could fail to see in this chain of events the awakening of 
a whole series of bourgeois-democratic national movements which strive to 
create nationally independent and nationally uniform states. It is precisely and 
solely because Russia and the neighbouring countries are passing through this 
period that we must have a clause in our programme on the right of nations to 
self-determination.”40  
Thus, Lenin’s conception of self-determination in 1914 was wholly and necessarily 
relevant not only to the Tsarist Empire but also to the European colonial empires. 
He spelt this out further in 1915, in a polemic with his fellow revolutionary Karl 
Radek: 
“We demand freedom of self-determination, i.e., independence, i.e., freedom 
of secession for the oppressed nations, not because we have dreamt of splitting 
up the country economically, or of the ideal of small states, but, on the 
contrary, because we want large states and the closer unity and even fusion of     
nations, only on a truly democratic, truly internationalist basis, which is 
inconceivable without the freedom to secede. Just as Marx, in 1869, demanded 
the separation of Ireland, not for a split between Ireland and Britain, but for a 
subsequent free union between them, not so as to secure “justice for Ireland”, 
but in the interests of the revolutionary struggle of the British proletariat, we in 
the same way consider the refusal of Russian socialists to demand freedom of 
self-determination for nations, in the sense we have indicated above, to be a 
direct betrayal of democracy, internationalism and socialism.”41 
Finally, in 1916, in a long article entitled ‘The Discussion on Self-Determination 
Summed Up”42, Lenin wrote, with regard to the colonies: 
                                                 
40 http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1914/self-det/ch03.htm  
41 V. Lenin ‘The Revolutionary Proletariat and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination”, Collected 
Works (Moscow: Progress, 1974) Vol.21, pp.407-414, at 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1915/oct/16.htm 
42 Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata No.1, October 1916, Collected Works (Moscow: Progress 1974) Vol.22, 
pp.320-360, at 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1916/jul/x01.htm 
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“Our theses say that the demand for the immediate liberation of the colonies is 
as “impracticable” (that is, it cannot be effected without a number of 
revolutions and is not stable without socialism) under capitalism as the self-
determination of nations, the election of civil servants by the people, the 
democratic republic, and so on—and, furthermore, that the demand for the 
liberation of the colonies is nothing more than “the recognition of the right of 
nations to self-determination”” 
It is, therefore, perfectly clear that Lenin’s conception of self-determination had 
nothing in common with that propounded by US President Woodrow Wilson after 
WWI. It should be recalled that standard texts on international law usually refer only 
to Wilson as progenitor of the concept. For Wilson, self-determination applied – and 
applied only – to the former Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires. The 
British, Belgian, French, Dutch, Spanish and Portuguese Empires were in no way to 
be threatened. And American interests in Puerto Rico and the Philippines were also 
sacrosanct. Lenin’s approach, on the other hand, was consistent, and revolutionary. 
4. THE SOVIET PRACTICE OF SELF-DETERMINATION 
I wish to maintain strongly that, for Lenin at least, self-determination was not a mere 
slogan, but a principle he put into practice with immediate effect within the former 
Russian Empire following the Bolshevik Revolution. According to Igor Blishchenko 
(1930-2000), one of the best Soviet scholars of international law43, in a text 
published, ironically, in 1968, the year that the USSR crushed the “Czech Spring”, 
Lenin’s Decree on Peace of 26 October 1917, for the first time extended the principle 
of the right to self-determination to all peoples, thereby discarding the imperialist 
distinction between “civilised” and “uncivilised” nations.44  
                                                
In fact, the Decree declared that: 
“By annexation or seizure of foreign territory the government, in accordance 
with the legal concepts of democracy in general and of the working class in 
particular, understands any incorporation of a small and weak nationality by a 
large and powerful state without a clear, definite and voluntary expression of 
agreement and desire by the weak nationality, regardless of the time when 
such forcible incorporation took place, regardless also of how developed or 
how backward is the nation forcibly attached or forcibly detained within the 
 
43 I worked with Blishchenko for a number of years, in particular on the draft of the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court; for a touching obituary by the International Committee of the Red 
Cross, see http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57JREV 
44 I. Blishchenko Antisovyetism i mezhdunarodnoye pravo (Antisovietism and international law) 
(Moscow: Izdatelstvo IMO, 1968)  69 
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frontiers of the [larger] state, and, finally, regardless of whether or not this 
large nation is located in Europe or in distant lands beyond the seas. 
If any nation whatsoever is detained by force within the boundaries of a 
certain state, and if [that nation], contrary to its expressed desire whether such 
desire is made manifest in the press, national assemblies, party relations, or in 
protests and uprisings against national oppression, is not given the right to 
determine the form of its state life by free voting and completely free from the 
presence of the troops of the annexing or stronger state and without the least 
desire, then the dominance of that nation by the stronger state is annexation, 
i.e., seizure by force and violence.”45 
In his article, Blishchenko moved next to answer a series of Western scholars who 
argued that the Decree was entirely hypocritical, first having no application to peoples 
within the USSR, and second, having been applied only to Finland in the former 
Tsarist Empire. He pointed to the substantial autonomy, if short of secession, enjoyed 
by Union and Autonomous Republics in the USSR in accordance with Article 17 of 
its Constitution. More importantly, he underlined the extent to which the principle 
was indeed put into practice by Lenin in the early years of the USSR. What he failed 
to point out, not surprisingly in 1968, is the fact that one of Lenin’s most bitter 
struggles with Stalin concerned independence for Georgia.46  
In a much later text47, Blishchenko showed that the early Soviet government was 
entirely consistent in implementing self-determination. On 4 (17) December 1917 the 
Soviet government recognised the right to self-determination of Ukraine. In response 
to the request of the Finnish government, the Soviet of Peoples’ Commissars on 18 
(31) December 1917 resolved to go to the Central Executive Committee with a 
proposal to recognise Finland’s independence. In fact, it was the Whites, seeking to 
restore the Empire, who opposed Finnish independence. By a Decree of 29 December 
1917 (11 January 1918) the right of the people of “Turkish Armenia” to self-
determination was recognised.  In answer to a request from the government of Soviet 
                                                 
45 http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/decreeonpeace.htm 
46 See M. Lewin Lenin’s Last Struggle (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2005)  
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osvoboditelnoye dvizheniye i razvitiye mezhdunarododnovo prava (The national liberation movement 
and the development of international law)’ (1967) No. 9 Sovetsoye gosudarstvo i pravo (Soviet state 
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Estland, on 7 December 1918 Lenin signed a Decree on recognition of the 
independence of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.  
On 5 February 1919 the Presidium of the All-Union Central Executive of Soviet 
Russia insisted, in a principled manner, that in implementing the principle of self-
determination, the issue was resolved by the self-determining nation itself, by the 
people itself. The dictatorship of the proletariat was not a condition for self-
determination, which applied equally to bourgeois independence movements. Thus, 
the Soviet government recognised the republics of Bukhara and Khorezm, which were 
not socialist. 
This was the profoundly significant historical context in which Yevgenii Pashukanis 
became the acknowledged theoretician and leader of a Marxist account of law and of 
international law 
4. SOVIET LEGAL DOCTRINE: YEVGENY PASHUKANIS 
4.1 Pashukanis’ history 
Pashukanis was born in what is now Lithuania in 1891, and was liquidated in 1937, 
condemned as a member of a “band of wreckers” and “Trotsky-Bukharin fascist 
agents”.48 He was a pupil of the Latvian-born legal theorist Piotr I. Stuchka, his senior 
by 25 years (Stuchka lived from 1865 to 1932, when, unusually for those times, he 
died of natural causes)49.  Chris Arthur has described Pashukanis’ “important 
contribution to the materialist critique of legal forms” as “to this day the most 
significant Marxist work on the subject”.50 I do not disagree. At the same time I hope 
to demonstrate that the paradoxical effects of Soviet practice (as opposed to the 
positivist theory they propagated) played a key role in developing and putting in place 
one of the most important principles of international law, the right of peoples to self-
determination. 
Pashukanis was, from 1925 to 1936, the leading theorist of law in the USSR, 
recognised as such by none other than Stuchka himself, who wrote that the General 
                                                 
48 C. Arthur ‘Introduction’ to Y. Pashukanis Law and Marxism: A General Theory. Towards a Critique 
of the Fundamental Concepts  (London: Pluto Press, 1983),  p.10 
49 I. Stuchka Selected Writings on Soviet Law and Marxism (edited, annotated, translated and 
introduced by R. Sharlet, P. Maggs and P. Beirne) (Armonk: M.E.Sharpe, 1988), p.x-xi 
50 C. Arthur Ibid p.9 
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Theory of Law and Marxism was “to the highest degree a valuable contribution to our 
Marxist theoretical literature on law and directly supplements my work, which 
provides only an incomplete and greatly inadequate general doctrine of law.”51 This 
was a period of “passionate legal debate”, well analysed by Michael Head.52 
Pashukanis was the Director of the Institute of Law of the Soviet Academy of 
Sciences, and effectively the country’s director of legal research and legal education. 
He made significant changes to legal education, including the virtual elimination of 
civil law subjects from the educational curriculum, and replacing them with an 
emphasis on economics and economic administration.53 John Hazard (1909-1955)54, 
who studied under him, recalled another side of his character: in the Institute the 
situation where he “…projected a theory said to be infallible, and where those who 
strayed from Pashukanis’ line were castigated like Korovin or denied faculty 
appointments, promotions and salary raises was novel to me.”55 That is probably 
disingenuous of Hazard, a native of American academe; but seems to be accurate. 
Edwin Garlan, writing in 1954 for an American audience during the Cold War, 
identified two conclusions reached by Pashukanis on the basis of his analysis of basic 
legal categories. First: 
“Only bourgeois-capitalist society creates all the conditions essential to the 
attainment of complete definiteness by the juridic element in social 
relationships”56   
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And second:  
“The dying out of the categories… of bourgeois law by no means signifies that 
they are replaced by new categories of proletarian law – precisely as the dying 
out of the category of value, capital, gain and so forth will not (with the 
transition to expanded socialism) mean that new proletarian categories of 
worth, capital rent and so forth appear. The dying out of the categories of 
bourgeois law will in these conditions signify the dying out of law in general: 
that is to say, the gradual disappearance of the juridic element in human 
relations.”57 
As Garlan notes, it follows from these propositions that the transition period of the 
dictatorship of the proletariat had to take the form of bourgeois law. Thus, the task of 
transition law was to eliminate itself, by way of a rapid movement to policy – 
technical - administration as opposed to civil and criminal law.58 
4.2 Pashukanis revived: China Miéville 
China Miéville, with his re-working of the “commodity-form theory of international 
law,59 has provided the most serious and sophisticated attempt in recent years at a 
Marxist account of international law60. The final sentence of his powerful book truly 
sums up his conclusion: “The chaotic and bloody world around us is the rule of 
law.”61 International law and human rights are at best distractions, on his account, and 
at worst potent weapons in the hands of the enemy. As he points out in his 
Introduction to Between Equal Rights, Miéville draws extensively from Pashukanis, 
who was one of the most serious Marxist legal theorists of the USSR or anywhere. 
Miéville traces and explains his arguments in Chapter Three, and seeks, through 
“immanent reformulation”, to answer some criticisms of Pashukanis.62 
China Miéville identifies in Critical Legal Studies and other so-called “New Stream” 
theories of international law an “implicit theory of the social world, an idealist 
                                                 
57 Y. Pashukanis ‘The General Theory of Law and Marxism’ (1924) in Evgeny Pashukanis, Selected 
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constructivism.”63, in which international law is sometimes depicted as a 
“constraining myth” inherited from the past, or where structures of everyday life such 
as international law are deemed to be “the accretion of ideas.” For Miéville, this 
privileges “…abstract concepts over the specific historic context in which certain 
ideas take hold, and how.”  
Miéville upholds a resolutely “classical” version of Marxism.64 As it happens, I agree 
with this. However, as explained by Miéville, Pashukanis argues that the logic of the 
commodity form is the logic of the legal form. In commodity exchange, he continues, 
“each commodity must be the private property of its owner, freely given in return for 
the other… Therefore, each agent in the exchange must be i) an owner of private 
property, and ii) formally equal to the other agent(s). Without these conditions, what 
occurred would not be commodity exchange. The legal from is the necessary form 
taken by the relation between these formally equal owners of exchange values.”65 For 
Miéville, law is called forth as a “specific form of social regulation… That form is 
law, which is characterised by its abstract quality, its being based on the equality of its 
subjects and its pervasive character in capitalism.”66 Miéville refers with approval to 
Pashukanis’ “… assertion that private law, rather than public law, is the ‘fundamental, 
primary level of law’. The rest of the legal superstructure can be seen as essentially 
derived from this.”67  
In fact, Pashukanis’ assertion goes rather further, and is as follows: 
“Yet while civil law, which is concerned with the fundamental, primary level 
of law, makes use of the concept of subjective rights with complete assurance, 
application of this concept in public-law theory creates misunderstandings and 
contradictions at every step. For this reason, the system of civil law is 
distinguished by its simplicity, clarity and perfection, while theories of 
constitutional law teem with far-fetched constructs which are so one-sided as 
to become grotesque. The form of law with its aspect of subjective right is 
born in a society of isolated bearers of private egotistic interests…”68 
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It is clear that Pashukanis knew Marx’ On the Jewish Question69, and it must be said 
that the passage just cited is highly reminiscent of what Marx had to say about the 
“rights of man”:  
“None of the so-called rights of man, therefore, go beyond egoistic man, 
beyond man as a member of civil society, that is, an individual withdrawn into 
himself, into the confines of his private interests and private caprice, and 
separated from the community.”70 
Later in the same passage, Marx expressed ironic puzzlement that in the French 
Declaration of 1789 “… finally, it is not man as citoyen, but man as bourgeois who is 
considered to be the essential and true man.” 
5. PASHUKANIS’ LIMITATIONS 
I am also a great admirer of Pashukanis’ early work. However, I doubt very much that 
his work on the commodity theory of law can really serve as the basis for a new 
theory of international law. Miéville himself at several points recognises Pashukanis’ 
limitations and contradictions. Here are some important objections. 
First, Pashukanis’ theory strongly suggests that there was no law as he defines it 
before the development of the commodity form, which only appeared with the 
development of capitalism. That must be either wrong or circular, a definition that 
depends upon itself. Miéville does not neglect this problem, and effectively criticises 
Pashukanis for “eliding” the distinction between the logical movement from simple to 
capitalist commodity exchange, and the historical movement from exchange of 
commodities under pre-capitalist societies to that in capitalism itself71. Miéville is 
forced to assert that: “A history of the development of the legal form can be 
developed using Pashukanis’ theory.”72 Chris Arthur notes this problem from a 
different point of view in his Introduction: 
“A difficulty that arises from a Marxist point of view is that the bourgeois 
regime is one of generalised commodity production; that is, it treats labour-
power as a commodity and pumps out surplus labour from the wage-workers. 
                                                 
69 See Y. Pashukanis Ibid  p.132, note 43 
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Yet Pashukanis makes reference to commodity exchange without taking 
account of the various forms of production that might involve production for a 
market…”73  
In other words, Pashukanis has failed to take into account the whole of human pre-
capitalist history.   
Second, Mieville, it seems to me, takes insufficient notice of Bob Fine’s critical 
remarks, which go to the heart of this particular re-appropriation of Pashukanis. First, 
as Fine points out, “Whereas Marx derived law from relations of commodity 
production, Pashukanis derived it from commodity exchange.”74 This, according to 
Fine, leads Pashukanis to a conclusion that was plainly wrong: 
“Instead of seeing both the content and the forms of law as determined by and 
changing with the development of productive relations, Pashukanis isolated 
law from its content and reduced quite different forms of law, expressing 
qualitatively different social relations, to a single, static and illusory ‘legal 
form’.”75 
And any ‘legal form’ must be bourgeois. As Fine explains, this led Pashukanis in 
1924 to argue that the Soviet Union of the New Economic Policy (NEP) was not yet 
ready for the abolition of law, and that, since law is in any event bourgeois, there can 
be no such thing as proletarian law. More to the point, Pashukanis was obliged by the 
logic of his own position to see the transition from capitalism to socialism simply as 
the replacement of commodity exchange by planned production, that is, the 
replacement of bourgeois (legal) forms by socialist (technical forms).76 Thus, as Fine 
points out, in 1929 he accepted Stalin’s view that communism was being achieved 
through the first Five-Year Plan.77 Miéville has read Fine78; but seems entirely to 
have missed the point of his criticism.  
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Third, Miéville’s reprinting and discussion of Pashukanis’ short essay on international 
law79 from 1925, fails to take account not only of the fact of Pashukanis’ intellectual 
trajectory until his death at the hands of Stalin in 1937, but, more importantly, the way 
in which that trajectory was already determined by Pashukanis’ early accommodation 
to Soviet technicism. Indeed, the essay formed part of the three volume Encyclopedia 
of State and Law which was launched and edited by Stuchka. Pashukanis contribution 
was entirely consistent with Stuchka’s overall line and policy. But the reasons for this 
went deeper than a mere desire for conformity, which in any event was not in 
Pashukanis’ character. As Fine explains, “Not only did Pashukanis invert the 
relationship between law and bureaucracy envisaged by Marx, he lost all sight of the 
democratic nature of Marx’s critique of the state, according to which its withering 
away was to be the result of its ever more radical democratisation.” 80  
6. PASHUKANIS’ OFFICIAL TRAJECTORY 
Pashukanis was a staunch loyalist in relation to the regime – by conviction rather than 
any sort of pressure. Thus, by 1932, Pashukanis, by then editor in chief of the official 
law journal Soviet State, was able to write a “hallelujah” in response to Stalin’s letter 
“Some questions on the history of Bolshevism”.81 Pashukanis’ major work on 
international law, Essays in International Law, appeared in 193582. Within two years 
he was dead, following Pravda’s announcement on 20 January 1937 that he had been 
found to be an enemy of the people – just two months after he had been named by the 
regime to supervise the revision of the whole system of Soviet codes of law. Michael 
Head’s analysis leads to a critical assessment of Pashukanis’ legacy: 
“He offered profound insights into the economic roots of the legal form, even 
if displaying several basic confusions in Marxist economics. However, he was 
weaker on the ideological and repressive role of law and the state apparatus. 
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And key aspects of his theory served the interests of the emerging Stalinist 
bureaucracy, with whom he aligned himself against the Left Opposition.”83 
Indeed, scholars such as Christine Sypnowich, who presents Pashukanis as an 
orthodox Marxist, coupling “Marx and Pashukanis” 84, and Ronnie Warrington85, for 
whom, following the US scholar Robert Sharlet, Pashukanis was an orthodox “Old 
Bolshevik”86, miss the extent to which Pashukanis’s theories led him inexorably to 
support for Stalin’s policies. 
As I show below, Pashukanis also entirely missed the revolutionary context for his 
analysis of international law. Moreover, his denunciation in 1937 and, posthumously, 
for the remainder of the Stalin period was based on the assertion that he failed to point 
out that “international law must be defined as class law in terms so simple and 
expressive that no one could possibly be deceived.”87 According to the US scholar 
Hazard, the Soviet reader was supposed by Soviet orthodoxy to be able to find 
“simple proof of the theoretician’s argument that foreign policy is shaped to fit the 
demands of the struggle between the classes, and that international law as the tool of 
that policy is no more than a reflection of class conflicts calling for some attempts at 
solution.”88 
As against Korovin, for whom a change of form must follow a change of substance, 
so that the Soviet Union had brought with it a new form of international law, the 
“international law of the transition period”, Pashukanis had argued for a continuation 
of old forms, including diplomatic immunity, the exchange of representatives, and the 
customary law of treaties, not least since these gave the Soviet Union considerable 
protection.  
Pashukanis roundly condemned Korovin’s doctrine: 
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“… scholars such as Korovin who argued that the Soviet Government should 
recognise only treaties [as a source of] international law and should reject 
custom are absolutely wrong. An attempt to impose upon the Soviet 
Government a doctrine it has nowhere expressed is dictated by the patent 
desire to deprive the Soviet Government of those rights which require no 
treaty formulation and derive from the fact that normal diplomatic relations 
exist.”89 
Pashukanis also came in for particular criticism because he called the principle rebus 
sic stantibus “healthy”.90  
Most copies of the Essays were destroyed after he was denounced in 1937, but in this 
culminating work he declared that any attempt to define the “nature of international 
law” was scholastic.91 In his view, such attempts were the result of the continuing 
influence of bourgeois legal methodology, which, he said, rested on the association of 
law with substance developing in accordance with its own internal principles. For 
him, in 1935, international law was a means of formulating and strengthening in 
custom and treaties various political and economic relationships between states, and 
that the USSR could use international law to further Soviet interests in the struggle 
with capitalist states. He saw no reason to believe that in using these principles of 
international law for its own purposes the USSR was compromising its principles, in a 
world in which most states were capitalist. For Pashukanis there was no point in 
seeking to determine whether international law was “bourgeois” or “socialist”; such a 
discussion would be “scholastic”.92  
This approach to international law is as far as it could be from a “commodity-form” 
theory. It is utterly positivist in its approach, in precisely the manner described by the 
“standard genre” to which I referred above. For Pashukanis, international law is 
composed simply of the treaties concluded by states, and such customary law as every 
state could agree on.   
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It should be no surprise that Pashukanis’ apparent theoretical stance changed as it did 
between 1925 and 1935. The context had completely changed. In his 1925 essay, 
Pashukanis was writing when the world appeared to be divided into two camps, 
capitalism and workers’ power, and when much of the planet was subject to 
colonialism. He wrote, quite correctly: “The historical examples adduced in any 
textbook of international law loudly proclaim that modern international law is the 
legal form of the struggle of the capitalist states among themselves for domination 
over the rest of the world.”93 In the 1935 textbook he said that international law as 
practised between capitalist states was one of the forms with the aid of which 
imperialist states carry on the struggle between themselves for territory and super-
profits.94 He also declared that the earliest international law appeared with the earliest 
class society, that is, with the development of the slave holding state which grew out 
of the tribal civilisation of primitive man as division of labour and acceptance of the 
concept of private property stratified society into classes.95 
Vyshinsky, Pashukanis’ nemesis – and Stuchka’s theoretical successor - was 
diametrically opposed to this: 
“Only one who is consciously falsifying history and reality can perceive in 
capitalist society the supreme and culminating point of legal development… 
Only in socialist society does law acquire a firm ground for its 
development…. As regards the scientific working out of any specific 
problems, the basic and decisive thought must be the aspiration to guarantee 
the development and strengthening of Soviet law to the highest degree.”96 
Indeed, Pashukanis’ 1935 textbook is absolutely standard in the ordering and style of 
its presentation. The exception is Chapter III, “Istoricheskii ocherk mezhdunarodnoi 
politiki i mezhdunarodnovo prava (Historical sketch of international policy and 
international law)”97, presents, with some references to Comrade Stalin, and “the 
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thesis of the victory of socialism in a single country”, a strictly factual account of the 
history of international law and policy from ancient times to “International relations in 
the period of the breakdown of capitalist stabilisation and the struggle of the USSR 
for peace”, with  the most attention given to the October Revolution of 1917 and the 
post WWI period.  
Pashukanis’ 1925-27 conception that “The real historical content of international law, 
therefore, is the struggle between capitalist states”98 rapidly gave way to “socialism in 
one country” and “peaceful co-existence”. As Hazard pointed out in 1938, 
“throughout the whole of any future discussion, the (Soviet) writer must re-emphasise 
the struggle for peace which is being waged by the USSR, and show how this struggle 
rests upon the sanctity of treaties and the observance of international obligations.”99 
The political context for this new orientation was the fact that the USSR was admitted 
to membership of the League of Nations on 18 September 1934, and, up to its 
aggression against Finland in December 1939 it was the leading protagonist of the 
League and of “collective security”.100 
Within a year the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and Hitler’s attack on the Soviet Union 
would bring an end to such political and scholarly imperatives. 
In the circumstances, Pashukanis could not possibly have predicted the thoroughly 
contradictory developments which followed WWII, in particular the creation and 
transformation of the United Nations, the development of the great multilateral, in 
some cases universal, international treaties, and the consolidation of political 
principles such as self-determination into fundamental principles – legal rights - of 
international law. Indeed, it was his own theoretical position which prevented him 
from doing so. His great protagonist E A Korovin, writing as early as 1923, placed 
particular emphasis on “Sovereignty as national self-determination”, “The legal form 
of self-determination”, “Bourgeois self-determination and the method of 
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‘Balkanisation’”.101 Korovin was much more a Bolshevik – a Leninist – than 
Pashukanis ever was. 
7. WHY DID PASHUKANIS MISS SELF-DETERMINATION? 
At this point there is an absence in Pashukanis’ work which is key to the argument of 
this chapter. He made only one reference to the “right of nations to self-
determination”, despite the fact that this was the centre of Lenin’s approach to 
international policy in the immediate post-1917 period. A factual account of 
“imperialist usurpation” is analysed only in relation to Lenin’s work on “imperialism 
as the highest stage of capitalism”. On Pashukanis’ 1935 account, the “basic fact of 
world history” after the October Revolution is the “struggle of two systems”: 
capitalism, and socialism as constructed in the USSR. The most important feature of 
the “Decree on Peace” of 8 November 1917 is the rejection of secret treaties. At this 
point Pashukanis introduced the following: “The declaration of the rights of the 
peoples of Russia proclaimed the right of each people to self-determination right up to 
secession and forming an independent state.”102 Pashukanis said nothing about any 
significance this might have for the imperialist and colonial systems.  
Pashukanis noted the creation of several new states on the ruins of the Austro-
Hungarian and Ottoman Empires, and the existence in most of them of significant 
national minorities – but he did not breathe a word on self-determination. The same is 
true of his account of the recognition by the USSR and conclusion of treaties with 
Estonia (2 February 1920), Lithuania (12 July 1920), Latvia (11 August 1920), and 
Finland (14 October 1920).103 The whole analysis is centred on the USSR and its 
interests. Thus, Pashukanis related that “the sympathy of the oppressed peoples of the 
colonies for the Soviet Union aroused the anger of the imperialists.”104 The Soviet 
Union, on the other hand, was “guided by support for the workers within the countries 
and in the whole world.”105  
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Pashukanis was quite clear that the many bilateral treaties concluded by the USSR 
from 1932, when Hitler came to power, onwards, were not directed against any third 
state, but were based on the policy of supporting peaceful relations with all states 
“and guaranteeing our socialist construction against the threats of intervention”.106 
Thus, the culmination of Soviet diplomatic efforts by 1935 was the invitation by 34 
states on 15 September 1934 for the USSR to join the League of Nations, and its 
accession on 18 September 1934, with only 3 states voting against and 7 
abstentions.107  According to Pashukanis, the “brilliant success” of Soviet foreign 
policy, was based on the internal policy of strengthening the dictatorship of the 
proletariat and construction of a classless socialist society. The “thesis of the 
possibility of the victory of socialism in one country” had determinate significance for 
resolving the problems of foreign policy. A list of principles contains, after breaking 
with the policy of the Tsarist and Provisional Governments, exit from the wars, 
proposing peace to all warring countries, publishing and denouncing all secret 
treaties, cancelling debts:  “… winning the trust and sympathy of the proletariat and 
oppressed peoples of the whole world, the proclamation of the principle of self-
determination of nations and brotherly solidarity of the proletariat and the colonial 
peoples of the whole world…”.108  
Pashukanis was incapable of recognising the significance of self-determination for 
international law. In my view, this was not simply the result of the limitations 
imposed by the period in which he was living, or the necessity to adapt to Stalin’s 
ideology, but was the direct consequence of his own theoretical position, worked out 
in the early 1920s.  
Miéville does of course notice these developments, in particular the fact that the UN 
Charter proclaimed the ‘equal rights and self-determination of peoples’.109 However, 
although he acknowledges that the struggles for de-colonisation after World War II 
represented a radical change in international law in relation to colonisation, he argues 
that it its content it is a mere continuation of the universalising trend in the form. By 
this he means that the logic of international law is and was “universalising”, or, in 
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other words, imperialist. Following Eric Hobsbawm’s 1994 Age of Extremes, Miéville 
notes the fact that waves of decolonisation struggles broke out first in Asia, then 
North Africa and the Middle East, then Sub-Saharan Africa. This was the point at 
which the United Nations General Assembly, twice the size that it was at the 
foundation of the UN, adopted the watershed Declaration on the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples110.  
Miéville fails to note the following salient points. First, as I have already outlined, 
“self-determination of nations” was the principled position thoroughly worked out by 
V I Lenin before the First World War, and put into practice by him in the context of 
the former Russian empire after WW I. Second, the principle was anathema to the 
Western imperialist powers, which were content for the former Russian, Austro-
Hungarian and Ottoman Empires to break up into new nations. Self-determination 
limited to these case was quite acceptable to the major imperialist powers. Third, the 
UN Charter contains a statement of principles including self-determination, but does 
not proclaim a right. This was a victory of the Western allies over the USSR and its 
partners. Fourth, it is significant that only in the context of victories of the national 
liberation movements did the principle of self-determination become a right in 
international law. 
In fact, both Pashukanis and Miéville seem to overlook the significance of the 
principle, then right, to self-determination. Pashukanis’ emphasis on the commodity 
form, and insistence that law only comes into its own in the context of capitalism, 
blinded him to the importance for international law of the political events in the midst 
of which he lived and worked. This may well have been a consequence of the 
perspective given to him by his own time and place.  But it was much more the 
inevitable consequence of his own theoretical position. 
8. THE USSR AND SELF-DETERMINATION AFTER WWII 
8.1 De-colonisation 
Blishchenko, writing in 1968, celebrated the break-up of the colonial system of 
imperialism, and the broad national liberation movements in Asia, Africa and Latin 
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America after WWII, which had posited the right of peoples to self-determination 
with new force. He asserted, with reason, that the USSR had done everything to 
ensure that the right became one of the fundamental principles of contemporary 
international law. This was due in part the work of the Soviet Delegation at the San 
Francisco Conference111 which drafted the Charter of the UN, as a result of which 
Article 2(1) of the Charter refers to “respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples…”.112  
As Morsink points out113, in 1914 Lenin calculated that more than one half of the 
world’s population lived in colonies, which covered ¾ of the world’s territory, a 
calculation that was still roughly correct at the end of the 1940s. The UN’s Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights was drafted just as the European empires began to 
break up. Two leading participants, Malik from Lebanon and Romulo from the 
Philippines, were from countries which became independent in 1946, together with 
Syria. India, Burma, Pakistan gained their independence in 1947, together with 
Ceylon in 1948. India and Pakistan were both active players in the drafting process.  
Andrei Zhdanov, Stalin’s favourite, delivered the key speech at the founding meeting 
of the Cominform (Communist Information Bureau), and announced that the world 
was divided into two camps, “the imperialist and anti-democratic camp” led by the 
United States, and the “democratic and anti-imperialist camp” led by the USSR. He 
asserted that there was a “crisis of the colonial system” and that “the peoples of the 
colonies no longer wish to live in the old way. The ruling classes of the metropolitan 
countries can no longer govern the colonies on the old lines.”114 Cassese relates that 
the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, the basis for the UN Charter, did not contain any 
reference to self-determination, but this was reconsidered at the end of April 1945, at 
the UN Conference on International Organisation in San Francisco – at the insistence 
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of the USSR.115 Thus, a draft was presented referring to “…respect for the principle 
of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.” 
                                                
As Tunkin noted in 1970, at the II Session of the UN General Assembly the Soviet 
delegation proposed an article for the Universal Declaration on Human Rights as 
follows: “Each people and each nation has the right to national self-determination. A 
state which has responsibility for the administration of self-determining territories,  
including colonies, must ensure the realisation of that right, guided by the principles 
and goals of the United Nations in relation to the peoples of such territories.” 
However, under pressure from the colonial powers this proposal was rejected, with 
the result that the principle of self-determination does not appear in the UDHR.116  
Dmitrii Grushkin notes117 that one key factor at the end of WWII was the 
strengthened role of the USSR and the appearance of a whole bloc of states oriented 
towards it. Further, a bi-polar system took shape in international relations in which the 
contradictory interests of the two sides could be clearly traced. Third, the role of the 
mass character of politics significantly grew during WWII: 110 million people from 
72 states took part. It was a war of peoples, not of governments. Fourth, in place of 
the League of Nations a global international organisation appeared with real resources 
and much more effective instruments. The UN sought to create on the basis of new 
principles (human rights, self-determination, sovereign equality of states) a powerful 
and effective international legal system. In the documents adopted by the UN, the idea 
of self-determination received new support, but also aroused bitter disputes. However, 
the USSR, with the support of the socialist countries and the newly independent states 
of Asia campaigned for the establishment of practically unlimited right to self-
determination of colonial and dependant countries and peoples.  
At the X session of the UNGA in 1955 the opponents of including the right to self-
determination into the Covenants argued that the UN Charter only refers to a 
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“principle” and not a “right” of peoples to self-determination, and that in various 
instruments the principle is interpreted in different ways. To the extent that the right 
to self-determination is a collective right, then it was inconsistent to include it in a 
document setting out the rights of individuals. Supporters however responded that 
despite the fact that the right to self-determination is collective, it affects each person, 
and that to remove it would be the precondition for limiting human rights. 
Furthermore, a state accepting the UN Charter and recognising it, must respect the 
“principle of self-determination” and the “right” flowing from it. The latter point of 
view triumphed, and the new “right” found its way into the common Article 1 of both 
the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights, and Social, Economic and 
Cultural Rights, respectively.118  
8.2 The right to self-determination in international law 
Heather Wilson reminds us119 that the admission of seventeen newly independent 
States at the opening of the fifteenth session of the General Assembly had a decisive 
effect on the UN. On 23 September 1960, the Soviet Union, grasping the opportunity 
presented by this dramatic development, requested the addition of a ‘declaration on 
the granting of independence to colonial peoples and countries and peoples’ to the 
agenda.120 This is a truly climactic moment in the development of contemporary 
international law. 
It was the USSR which submitted to the XV Session of the UN General Assembly the 
draft of the historic Resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, the “Declaration on 
the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples”. This historic 
resolution aroused a whole wave of reactions and protests, but, none the less, was 
adopted. This document noted the connection between the right of peoples to self-
determination and individual freedoms. Following on the heels of Resolution 1514 
(XV) came a whole series of documents of a similar type: Resolution 1803 (XVII) of 
14 December 1962 on “Inalienable sovereignty in relation to natural resources”; 
Resolution 2105 (XX) of 20 December 1965 “On the realisation of the Declaration on 
the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples” – the General 
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Assembly recognized the legitimacy of the struggle of colonial peoples against 
colonial domination in the exercise of their right to self-determination and 
independence, and it invited all States to provide material and moral support to 
national liberation movements in colonial territories. Dmitrii Grushkin notes121 that 
one key factor at the end of WWII was the strengthened role of the USSR and the 
appearance of a whole bloc of states oriented towards it. Further, a bi-polar system 
took shape in international relations in which the contradictory interests of the two 
sides could be clearly traced. Third, the role of the mass character of politics 
significantly grew during WWII: 110 million people from 72 states took part. It was a 
war of peoples, not of governments. Fourth, in place of the League of Nations a global 
international organisation appeared with real resources and much more effective 
instruments. The UN sought to create on the basis of new principles (human rights, 
self-determination, sovereign equality of states) a powerful and effective international 
legal system. In the documents adopted by the UN, the idea of self-determination 
received new support, but also aroused bitter disputes.  
In the 1966 Covenants on human rights, which to begin with were developed as a 
single document, it was decided that the provision on self-determination be included 
on the basis that: 
a) it “…is the source or essential foundation for other human rights, since 
there cannot be authentic realisation of individual rights without realisation of 
the right to self-determination” 
b) in drafting the Covenants the realisation and protection of the principles and 
goals of the UN Charter must be taken into account, including the principles of 
equal rights and self-determination of peoples 
c) a series of provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are 
directly connected to the right to self-determination 
d) if the right was not included in the Covenants, they would be incomplete 
and ineffective.122 
Writing in 1970, Tunkin also pointed out that if in 1919 as many as 64% of the 
population of the planet lived in colonies and semi-colonies, then at the start of 1969 
only 1% of humanity remained in colonies. It was on this basis that both the 
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International Covenants have a common Article 1, on the right in international law of 
peoples to self-determination. This was a remarkable achievement by the USSR and 
its allies in the de-colonised world.123  
8.3 The National Liberation Movements 
The success of the USSR and its allies in the 1960s had momentous consequences for 
the legal and political process of decolonisation. Later resolutions of the UNGA 
ensured that the so-called “national liberation movements”124 were recognised as the 
“sole legitimate representatives” of the relevant peoples. In other words, ex-territorial 
social and political organisations were in fact made equal to sovereign subjects of 
international law. Examples were the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), the 
South West African Peoples Organisation (SWAPO), the ANC (African National 
Congress) and PAC (Pan African Congress). In 1973 the UN declared that it 
recognised SWAPO as the “sole authentic representative of the people of Namibia.” 
And in 1974 the PLO was recognised by the majority of member states of the UN as 
the lawful representative of the Palestinians, with corresponding status at the UN.  
There are writers such as Christopher Quaye, who ignore the Soviet role in promoting 
the legal right to self-determination or supporting the national liberation 
movements.125 However, Galia Golan, although seemingly unaware of the 
international law dimension, wrote in the context of national liberation movements 
that: “The term preferred by the Soviets [to “independence”] as an overall, all-
inclusive type of objective was self-determination.”126 Her book demonstrates the 
huge resources devoted by the USSR to support of all kinds for a very wide range of 
national liberation movements in the Third World. Tables she prepared list 43 
movements in 26 countries, with 13 instruments of “Soviet behaviour”.127 Roger 
Kanet noted that “Soviet trade with the developing nations increased more than eleven 
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times from 1955 to 1970”. In 1970 it increased an additional 15.7 percent.128 
Furthermore, Bhabani Sen Gupta pointed out that “in cultivating friendly, viable 
forces, the Soviet union has persistently tried to satisfy some of the felt needs of the 
power elites of Third World societies. In South Asia, they have come forward to 
provide aid for industrialisation programs in India, for which the Indians could not 
secure resources either domestically of from Western nations…”129 
I would contend, contrary to these authors, that it was not as a result of Soviet 
propaganda, but through the logic of the new international law, developed through the 
efforts of the USSR and its allies, that a people with the right to self-determination 
faced with aggressive attempts to deny that right enjoyed the right of self-defence 
under Article 51 of the Charter, and was in all respects be considered a subject of 
international law. Thus, Portugal was at that time waging war against the peoples of 
Angola and Mozambique; those peoples were therefore victims of aggression and 
enjoyed the right of self-defence, and third party states had the right and duty to come 
to their assistance.130 G I Tunkin, a year earlier, in a more formal article, defending 
the dubious concept of “proletarian internationalism”, also linked the “struggle for 
international peace and security” with the “struggle for the freedom and independence 
of peoples”, with reference especially to Resolution 1514 (XV).131  
9. VIETNAM AND THE CZECH SPRING: FURTHER CONTRADICTIONS IN 
SELF-DETERMINATION 
1968 was not only the year of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, but also a 
crucial moment in the US war in Vietnam. The invasion of Czechoslavkia took place 
against the background of the emergence of a new “socialist international law”, with a 
new approach to traditional concepts of sovereignty. G. I Tunkin published a revised 
second edition of his textbook on International Law.132  According to him, it 
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appeared to commentators in the United States that the new Soviet position could be 
dated back to Pashukanis’ conclusion in the 1920s that the Soviet Union could and 
did utilise generally accepted norms of domestic and international law both in the 
administration of the state affairs and in conducting relations with foreign states. 
Through this practice, it gave the bourgeois norms a new Socialist content.133   
                                                
Dealing with the Czechoslovak events, Tunkin argued that these were a logical 
extension of the concept already well developed and applied in Hungary in 1956. This 
was the legal prevention of inroads by capitalist influences into a socialist state.134 
The international law framework is provided through an analysis of the concept of 
sovereignty. Tunkin noted that both general and socialist international law respected 
the concept of “sovereignty”, but concluded that respect is not the same thing in the 
two systems.135 Socialist states would continue to insist on respect for the principle as 
developed in general international law when speaking of the relationships between 
themselves and capitalist states so as to prevent capitalist states from intervening in 
the internal affairs of Socialist states, but the concept of sovereignty had evolved 
within the conceptual framework of “proletarian internationalism” as regards the 
mutual relationships of socialist states.  His translator, William Butler, commented: 
“The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia plainly was a difficult moment for his 
approach to international law, and his treatment of a “socialist international law” 
impressed, rightly or wrongly, as something less than enthusiastic.”136 
Tunkin’s arguments should be contrasted with what, in the same year, the US scholar 
Alwyn Freeman was able to write:  
“In the years following World War II increasing interest has been evidenced in 
the extent to which Soviet theory and practice may have influenced the 
development of the law of nations. This is to be expected in view of the 
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prominence and power which the USSR has come to enjoy in the world 
community.”137 
Freeman denounced what he saw as a “political dogma dressed in treacherous legal 
trappings”, namely the official Soviet doctrine of “peaceful coexistence”. He referred, 
as do so many American scholars of the period, as well as President Kennedy in his 
post-inauguration speeches, to an alleged address by Khrushchev to a Soviet 
Communist Party audience on 6 January 1961.138 In one account:  
“Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev delivered a speech behind closed doors in 
which he asserted that “a mighty upsurge of anti-imperialist, national-
liberation revolutions” was sweeping through the “third world.” He went on to 
say that “Communists fully and unreservedly support such just wars . . . of 
national liberation.”139 
The impact of Khrushchev’s words was felt in the US itself and in its subsequent 
policy: 
“The speech, published in the Soviet press just two days before the newly 
elected President John F. Kennedy took his oath of office, had a profound 
effect on the new administration which regarded it as a portent of wars to 
come. Kennedy and his advisers concluded that the Cold War was entering a 
new phase which would take place in the “third world,” and would be 
characterized by guerrilla wars. Accordingly, they sought to improve the 
nation’s ability to conduct counter insurgency warfare by dramatically 
expanding the Army’s Special Forces or, “green berets.” Before Kennedy’s 
assassination in Dallas in 1963, he had dispatched over 16,000 of them to 
South Viet Nam in order to engage in just such a conflict. The war for the 
“third world,” and a new phase of the Cold War had gotten under way in 
earnest.”140 
This address may well be apocryphal; it has proved impossible for me to track down a 
definite reference. But there is every reason to believe that its effect was as described. 
It had its effect on the scholars too. For Freeman, while accommodations of mutually 
acceptable principles were possible in 1968, no progress in international law was 
possible until “the Soviet Union is prepared to abjure its messianic and compulsive 
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espousal of the doctrine of world revolution.”141 Freeman was of course writing at the 
height of the Vietnam War: he expresses outrage that the public opinion barrage 
orchestrated by the USSR “…actually inhibited the United States from using tear gas 
where such use was in the interest of humane treatment of the civilian population.”142 
The leading Soviet scholars were, in the end, obliged to abandon both positivism and 
the revolutionary content of self-determination. Writing in 1991, just before the 
dissolution of the USSR, and using the new language of “perestroika”, “common 
human values” and “common European home”, Blishchenko also argued for “re-
thinking the periodisation of the contemporary history of international law, and for 
reading its formation not in the October Revolution of 1917 but the French bourgeois 
revolution, for the first time promoting such generally recognised norms and 
principles of international law as the right of peoples to self-determination…”143 
However, the principle, then right, of self-determination played in my view a much 
more significant role, both in its practical effects in the international order, and as the 
“obscene other” of Soviet positivism in international law.  
This paradoxical, dialectical aspect of Soviet international law is entirely missed by 
Miéville. In this, it has to be said, he takes his place in a well-established tradition of 
the critique of “socialist law”. It seems to me that a radical re-working of Pashukanis’ 
contribution is required in order to account satisfactorily with the role of law in a 
world in which capitalism has – as it must, and as Marx predicted – spread to every 
corner. Turbulence has grown proportionately with interdependence. The Iraq 
adventure is a compelling example not of the omnipotence of US power, but of its 
radical limitations, and the indomitable human spirit. 
What Miéville quite rightly draws from Pashukanis is what he terms “materialism”, 
that is, the crucial importance of economic and political investigation and analysis for 
analysing developments in law, without forgetting law’s real existence and relative 
autonomy as a constant but endlessly metamorphosing aspect of human existence – 
like religion, with which, as a human construct, it has so much in common. 
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The right of peoples to self-determination in international law achieved the status of a 
right in the context of de-colonisation and – thoroughly paradoxical and hypocritical – 
Soviet support both for the principle and for national liberation movements. It was 
law, indeed a pillar of the international rule of law. 
CONCLUSION – ANOTHER ACCOUNT 
At this point I would like to propose an alternative reading to China Miéville’s 
relentlessly pessimistic account of the post-WWII movements for de-colonisation, and 
“peoples’ rights”, especially the right to self-determination and the right to 
development – the New International Economic Order which he mentions in passing. 
Here a thoroughly dialectical case can be made. There is no question that the 
movements for colonial freedom and de-colonisation were, as shown above, bitterly 
opposed by all the imperialist powers. In each case – France in Vietnam and Algeria, 
Britain in Kenya and Malaysia, the US, to this day, in Puerto Rico, Portugal in 
Mozambique and Angola, the South African and Israeli experiences – the response of 
imperialism was ferocious and bloody. It is not enough to note that some of these 
became petty imperialisms in their own right, or in many ways simply served the 
interests of the former colonial power. 
For me, it is vitally important to note that the demand for self-determination became a 
vitally important part of the external legitimation and ideological self-empowerment 
of these movements. In a paradoxical – and dialectical – fashion, the USSR, despite 
the profound deracination of its approach to international law, as exemplified by 
Vyshinsky144 and Tunkin145, found itself obliged to give very considerable material 
support to self-determination struggles, despite the fact that this was not only 
materially costly but often contrary to its own geo-political self-interest. I mean 
dialectical in the following way: the content of the proposed norm often came into 
sharp conflict with its juridical form, and in the process the content was imbued with a 
new significance, in due course transforming the form as well. 
                                                 
144 A. Vyshinsky The Law of the Soviet State (Tr. H.W. Baab) (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 
Publishers, 1979) 
145 G. I. Tunkin Theory of International Law (Butler, W. E. (trans) (London: George Allen & Unwin, 
1974) 
 37
                                                
In every case the process was not ideal – it was not the work of professors – but 
thoroughly material. This is what Patricia Williams in The Alchemy of Race and Class 
refers to as the subversion and appropriation of bourgeois legal norms – a process of 
alchemy146. Thus, the United Nations itself was transformed, not in effectiveness or 
ultimate independence, but in the unique possibility it gives for the less powerful 
states – and international civil society – to gather and speak.  
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